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NOTES
PARTNER BANKRUPTCY AND PARTNERSHIP
DISSOLUTION: PROTECING THE TERMS OF THE
CONTRACT AND ENSURING
PREDICTABILITY
INTRODUCTION
The dissolution of a partnership is defined as a change in the relation
of the partners caused by any partner ceasing to be associated in the
partnership business.' Dissolution thus designates the point in time
when all of the partners cease to carry on the business together.2
Both the Uniform Partnership Act' ("UPA") and the Revised Uni-
form Limited Partnership Act4 ("RULPA") provide that the bankruptcy
of a general partner causes a partnership' to be dissolved.6 Because these
1. See Uniform Partnership Act § 29, 6 U.L.A. 364 (1969) (hereinafter UPA).
2. See UPA § 29 official comment, 6 U.L.A. 364-65 (1969). Upon dissolution, the
partnership is not immediately terminated but continues to exist until all partnership
affairs are settled. See id. § 30, 6 U.L.A. 367 (1969). This post-dissolution settling pro-
cess is known as "winding up." See id § 29 official comment, 6 U.L.A. 364-65 (1969).
Where dissolution of the partnership is caused by the bankruptcy of a general partner,
see infra note 6 and accompanying text, dissolution terminates the insolvent partner's
authority to act on behalf of the partnership. See id § 33, 6 U.L.A. 423-24 (1969). This
has two important ramifications. First, the insolvent partner may not bind the partner-
ship by any act. See id § 35(3)(b), 6 U.L.A. 430 (1969); accord In re Sunset Developers,
69 Bankr. 710, 712 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1987); Houchen v. Gadberry (In re Gadberry), 30
Bankr. 13, 13 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1983). Second, only the remaining, non-bankrupt part-
ners may participate in the winding-up of partnership affairs, unless the bankrupt partner
can show cause as to why he should be allowed to wind up. See UPA § 37, 6 U.LA. 444
(1969); Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 803, 6 U.L.A. 379-80 (Supp. 1991)
(hereinafter RULPA); accord Brandt & Brandt Printers, Inc. v. Klein, 220 F.2d 935, 937
(2d Cir. 1955); Normandin v. Normandin (In re Normandin), 106 Bankr. 14, 16 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1989); In re Minton Group, Inc., 27 Bankr. 385, 391 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983),
aff'd, 46 Bankr. 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Smith, Partners and Partnerships in Bankruptcy, in
Partnerships: UPA, ULPA, Securities, Taxation and Bankruptcy 668-69 (ALI-ABA
1985); Bromberg, Partnership Dissolution - Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 43 Tex. L
Rev. 631, 649 (1965).
3. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved
and promulgated the Uniform Partnership Act in 1914. The UPA generally governs all
general partnership law in this country. See UPA, Commissioner's Prefatory Note, 6
U.L.A. 7 (1969).
4. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated
the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act in 1976 to replace and update the original
Uniform Limited Partnership Act ("ULPA"), which had been promulgated in 1916. In
1985, the Commissioners amended a number of the RULPA's provisions. See RULPA,
Historical Note, 6 U.L.A. 240 (Supp. 1991).
5. A "general" partnership is one in which all the partners are "general partners,"
each sharing the profits and losses as well as the management equally. See Black's Law
Dictionary 1120-21 (6th ed. 1990). A "limited" partnership is a partnership consisting of
"one or more general partners and one or more limited partners." RULPA § 101(7), 6
U.L.A. 271 (Supp. 1991). The general partner(s) in a limited partnership are solely re-
sponsible for the management of the partnership, and are liable for partnership debts as if
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dissolution provisions have been adopted into the partnership law of al-
most every state,7 federal bankruptcy courts have generally enforced the
in a general partnership. See RULPA §§ 403(a), 403(b), 6 U.L.A. 345 (Supp. 1991);
Black's Law Dictionary 1121 (6th ed. 1990). In contrast, the limited partner(s) generally
do not participate in the management of the partnership, 'and are not liable to third par-
ties for the obligations of the partnership. See RULPA § 303, 6 U.L.A. 325 (Supp. 1991);
see also Bromberg, supra note 2, at 640 n.52 (discussing limitations on limited partners).
Despite this distinction, this Note will use the term "partnership" to refer inclusively
to both general and limited partnerships. Among other reasons, this practice is justified
because dissolution on account of a general partner's bankruptcy applies equally to lim-
ited and general partnerships. See Bromberg, supra note 2, at 642; infra note 6; see also
UPA § 6(2), 6 U.L.A. 22 (1969) (where the ULPA or RULPA is silent on an area of
partnership law, gap is filled by reference to the general UPA); RULPA § 1105, 6 U.L.A.
413 (Supp. 1991) (same); R. Haft, Investment Limited Partnerships: And Other Pass-
Through Vehicles Pt. I § 15.03 (1989) (ULPA is silent on causes and effect of dissolution
and gap is filled by UPA).
6. Section 31(5) of the UPA states in pertinent part: "Dissolution is caused... [b]y
the bankruptcy of any partner or the partnership." See UPA § 31(5), 6 U.L.A. 376
(1969).
Unless the partners otherwise agree, the RULPA specifically requires dissolution of a
limited partnership upon a general partner's voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy, initi-
ated under either Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code (liquidation), Chapter 11 (reorgani-
zation), or Chapter 13 (adjustment of debts of an individual). See RULPA §§ 402(4),
402(5), 801, 6 U.L.A. 341-42, 375 (Supp. 1991). In so doing, the RULPA reflects a
judgment that limited partners can rid themselves of a general partner who is in such dire
financial straits that he is the subject of bankruptcy proceedings. See RULPA § 402
comment, 6 U.L.A. 342 (Supp. 1991). Three provisions of the RULPA regulate dissolu-
tion. Section 801(4) provides that a limited partnership is dissolved upon the withdrawal
of a general partner. See RULPA § 801(4), 6 U.L.A. 375 (Supp. 1991). Sections 402(4)
and 402(5) then define an "event of withdrawal" to include the voluntary and involuntary
filing of a petition in bankruptcy seeking reorganization, readjustment or liquidation of a
general partner. See RULPA §§ 402(4), 402(5), 6 U.L.A. 341-42 (Supp. 1991).
This Note does not discuss the issue of dissolution when the partnership itself files for
bankruptcy. For commentaries discussing the effect of partnership bankruptcy, see Eibl,
Strategies for Partners Under The Bankruptcy Code When The Partnership is Insolvent, 61
Am. Bankr. L.J. 37 (1987); Kennedy & Smith, Some Issues in Partnership and Partner
Bankruptcy Cases and Recommendations for Legislative Change, in Partnerships: UPA,
ULPA, Securities, Taxation, and Bankruptcy 809 (ALI-ABA 1990); O'Dea & Roseen,
Issues in Partnership Bankruptcy, 488 Pract. L. Inst. Comm. 499 (1989).
7. Partnerships are created pursuant to, and are largely governed by, state law. See
59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnerships § 22 (1987); see also L. King, Collier Bankruptcy Manual 1
303.03[2], at 303-14 (3d ed. 1990) ("[a]s a general rule, state statutes and decisions on
partnership law control the question as to whether there is in fact a partnership").
The UPA has been adopted by every state except Louisiana, and by the District of
Columbia, Guam and the Virgin Islands. See UPA, Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act
Has Been Adopted, 6 U.L.A. 1-2 (Supp. 1991). Georgia, while adopting the UPA, has
eliminated the bankruptcy of a partner as a cause of dissolution. Compare UPA § 31, 6
U.L.A. 376 (1969) with Ga. Code Ann. § 14-8-31 (1989).
The 1976 version of the RULPA, for its part, has been adopted by 46 states and the
District of Columbia. See RULPA, Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been
Adopted, 6 U.L.A. 239-40 (Supp. 1991). Although the RULPA has not been adopted by
every state, the dissolution of limited partnerships upon the bankruptcy of the general
partner is still the rule in those non-adopting states. First, every remaining state except
Louisiana has adopted the ULPA. See Ale, Substantive Law and Special Problems of
General and Limited Partnerships, in Partnerships: UPA, ULPA, Securities, Taxation,
and Bankruptcy 1, 56 (ALI-ABA 1990); Kennedy, Partnerships and Partners Under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act and the New (Proposed) Bankruptcy Rules, 27 St. Louis U.L.J.
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UPA and RULPA dissolution provisions as incorporated in state law,8
and have held partnerships to be dissolved upon the filing of a bank-
ruptcy petition by a general partner.9 In addition to these state laws,
partnership agreements commonly contain clauses that effect the same
result."0 These built-in dissolution provisions are known as "ipso facto"
507, 511 n.9 (1983) [hereinafter Kennedy IlJ. Second, the ULPA is silent on the issue of
dissolution. See Haft, supra note 5, at § 15.03; Bromberg, supra note 2, at 633. Third, if
the ULPA is silent, reference is made to the widely adopted UPA. See supra note 5.
8. For the general partnership dissolution provisions of these states, see Ala. Code
§ 10-8-91 (1987); Alaska Stat. § 32.05.260 (Supp. 1990); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 29-231
(1989); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 4-42-603 (1987); Cal. Corp. Code § 15031 (West Supp. 1991);
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 7-60-131 (1986); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 34-69 (West 1987); Del.
Code Ann. tit. 6, § 1531 (1975); D.C. Code Ann. § 41-130 (1990); Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 620.71 (West 1977); Guam Civ. Code § 2425 (1970); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 425-131 (1985);
Idaho Code § 53-331 (1988); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 106§ , 31 (Smith-Hurd 1987); Ind. Code
Ann. § 23-4-1-31 (Burns 1989); Iowa Code Ann. § 544.31 (West 1987); Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 56-331 (1983); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.300 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1987); Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann. tit. 31, § 311 (Supp. 1990); Md. Corps. & Ass'ns Code Ann. § 9-602 (1985);
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 108A, § 31 (Law. Co-op. 1985); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 449.31
(West 1967); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 323.30 (West 1981); Miss. Code Ann. § 79-12-61 (1989);
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 358.310 (Vernon 1968); Mont. Code Ann. § 35-10-603 (1989); Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 67-331 (1990); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 87.3 10 (Michie 1991); N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 304-A:31 (1984); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 42:1-31 (West Supp. 1990); N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 54-1-31 (1988); N.Y. Partnership Law § 62 (McKinney 1988); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 59-61
(1989); N.D. Cent. Code § 45-09-03 (1978); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1775.30 (Anderson
1985); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 54, § 231 (West 1991); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 68.530 (1988);
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 8353 (Purdon 1990); R.I. Gen. Laws § 7-12-42 (1985); S.C. Code
Ann. § 33-41-930 (Law. Co-op. 1990); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 48-5-10 (1983); Tenn.
Code Ann. § 61-1-130 (1989); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6132(b), § 31 (Vernon 1970);
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-28 (1989); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11, § 1323 (1984); V.I. Code Ann.
tit. 26, § 123 (1970); Va. Code Ann. § 50-31 (1989); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 25.04.310
(1969); W. Va. Code Ann. § 47-8A-31 (1986); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 178.26 (West 1989);
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 17-13-603 (1989). For a listing of the states' provisions relating to
limited partnerships, see RULPA, Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been
Adopted, 6 U.L.A. 239-40 (Supp. 1991).
9. See, eg., Turner v. Lee (In re Minton Group, Inc.), 46 Bankr. 222, 224 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (limited partnership dissolved as a matter of law upon partner's bankruptcy); In re
Sunset Developers, 69 Bankr. 710, 712 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1987) (same, for general part-
nership); Holcomb v. Fulton (In re Fulton), 43 Bankr. 273, 276 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.
1984) (same, for general partnership); Houchen v. Gadberry (In re Gadberry), 30 Bankr.
13, 13 (Bankr. C.D. M. 1983) (same, for general partnership); see also Connolly v. Nut-
hatch Hill Assoc. (In re Manning), 831 F.2d 205, 207 (10th Cir. 1987) (general partner-
ship automatically dissolved as a factual matter when a partner filed for bankruptcy);
Allan Constr. Co. v. United States, 646 F.2d 487, 495 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (same, for joint
venture); Normandin v. Normandin (In re Normandin), 106 Bankr. 14, 15 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1989) (same, for general partnership); Harbor Pointe Office Park, Ltd., I v. Pru-
dential Nat'l Assurance Co. (In re Harbor Pointe Office Park, Ltd., I), 83 Bankr. 44, 46
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1988) (same, for limited partnership); Skeen v. Harms (In re Harms), 10
Bankr. 817, 821 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981) (same, for limited partnership).
10. See O'Dea & Roseen, supra note 6, at 521; see also Kaster & Cymbler, The Impact
of a General Partner's Bankruptcy Upon the Remaining Partners, 21 Real Prop. Prob. Tr.
J. 539, 539 (1986) ("Most real estate partnership agreements contain provisions dealing
with the possible bankruptcy of the general partner."); Fogel, Executory Contracts and
Unexpired Leases in the Bankruptcy Code, 64 Minn. L. Rev. 341, 347 (1980) (contracting
parties often add bankruptcy clauses to their arrangements to insure the benefit of their
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clauses or simply "bankruptcy" clauses."
Despite both the broad acceptance of the UPA and RULPA dissolu-
tion provisions and the prevalence of bankruptcy clauses within partner-
ship agreements, some courts have held that a general partner's
bankruptcy does not dissolve a partnership.' 2 One group of cases argues
that section 365(e)(1)' 3 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code, 4 which nulli-
fies bankruptcy termination clauses in executory contracts, prohibits
partnership dissolution on account of a general partner's bankruptcy,
and overrides contrary state law by virtue of the Supremacy Clause' 5 of
the United States Constitution. 16 A second group of cases, focusing on
bargain); cf 3 D. Cowans, Bankruptcy Law and Practice § 15.7 (1989) (many partner-
ship agreements permit the removal of bankrupt general partners).
11. See Nimmer, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Protecting the Fundamental
Terms of the Bargain, 54 U. Colo. L. Rev. 507, 540 (1983); Note, Legislative and Judicial
Confusion Concerning Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, 89 Dick. L. Rev. 1029, 1033
n.16 (1984).
12. See In re Todd, 118 Bankr. 432, 435 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1989); In re Hawkins, 113
Bankr. 315, 316 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990); In re Corky Foods Corp., 85 Bankr. 903, 904
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988); In re B C & K Cattle Co., 84 Bankr. 69, 71 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1988); Petralex Stainless, Ltd. v. Bishop Tube Div. of Christiana Metals (In re Petralex
Stainless, Ltd.), 78 Bankr. 738, 741-42 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); In re Safren, 65 Bankr.
566, 569-70 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986).
13. The relevant text of section 365(e)(1) is as follows:
Notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract.., or in applicable law,
an executory contract ... of the debtor may not be terminated or modified, and
any right or obligation under such contract ... may not be terminated or
modified, at any time after the commencement of the case solely because of a
provision in such contract ... that is conditioned on - (A) the insolvency or
financial condition of the debtor at any time before the closing of the case; (B)
the commencement of a case under this title; or (C) the appointment of or tak-
ing possession by a trustee in a case under this title or a custodian before such
commencement
11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1) (1988) (emphasis added); see also infra text accompanying notes
27-39 (further explaining this provision).
14. [Bankruptcy Reform] Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549
(1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988)) [hereinafter the Bank-
ruptcy Code or the Code].
15. The United States Constitution provides that "[tlhis Constitution, and the Laws
of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme
Law of the Land." U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (the "Supremacy Clause"). Thus, any state
law contrary to the laws of Congress are invalid. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat) 1, 22 (1824). As Congress has the power to establish a uniform bankruptcy law,
see U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, the United States Supreme Court has held that the
supremacy clause applies to federal bankruptcy law. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S.
637, 649-52 (1971).
16. See In re Todd, 118 Bankr. 432, 435 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1989); In re Corky Foods
Corp., 85 Bankr. 903, 904 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988); Petralex Stainless, Ltd. v. Bishop
Tube Div. of Christiana Metals (In re Petralex Stainless, Ltd.), 78 Bankr. 738, 741-42
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); cf Cardinal Indus., Inc. v. Buckeye Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In
re Cardinal Indus., Inc.), 105 Bankr. 834, 849 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989) (using same argu-
ment in holding that Chapter 11 filing does not terminate partner's management interest
in partnership); In re Rittenhouse Carpet, Inc., 56 Bankr. 131, 131-32 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1985) (employing same argument to invalidate both partnership law and partnership
agreement requiring removal of bankrupt general partner of limited partnership); CP
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situations where a general partner seeks "reorganization" under Chapter
11"7 of the Code,"8 has rejected dissolution on the grounds of statutory
construction and public policy.19
A split in bankruptcy authority and commentary therefore exists on
whether partnership dissolution occurs when a general partner files an
individual petition for bankruptcy. This disagreement has created confu-
sion regarding the practical effect of a general partner's bankruptcy on a
partnership,2" and has generally de-stabilized the relationship between
partnership and bankruptcy law.
This Note argues that dissolution should be controlled by the provi-
sions of partnership agreements, including the relevant state law that is
implicitly a part of such agreements. 2 ' This argument rests on the dual
notion that (i) partnership agreements are excepted from section
365(e)(1) of the Code' by virtue of the effect of section 365(e)(2),' and
(ii) there are compelling public policy arguments and practical reasons
for upholding the terms of the partnership agreement that mandate
dissolution.
Part I of this Note examines the argument that partnerships do not
dissolve upon a general partner's bankruptcy. Part II addresses the "no
dissolution" argument based on Code section 365(e)(1) and refutes the
notion that the section mandates such a result. Part III addresses and
Yorketown, Inc. v. Fidelity Am. Mortgage Co. (In re Fidelity Am. Mortgage Co.), 10
Bankr. 781, 782 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981) (same).
17. See I1 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1988).
18. See, eg., In re Safren, 65 Bankr. 566, 570 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986) (formulating
the analysis only with regard to a partner's Chapter I 1 case). In other words, this analy-
sis does not apply to general partner liquidation cases under Chapter 7 of the Code, I 1
U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1988).
19. See Safren, 65 Bankr. at 569; accord In re Hawkins, 113 Bankr. 315, 316-17
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990); In re Corky Foods Corp., 85 Bankr. 903, 904 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1988); In re B C & K Cattle Co., 84 Bankr. 69, 71 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988); Petralex
Stainless, Ltd. v. Bishop Tube Div. of Christiana Metals (In re Petralex Stainless, Ltd.),
78 Bankr. 738, 741-42 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
20. See, e.g., O'Dea & Roseen, supra note 6, at 521, 526-27 (warning those who draft
partnership agreements to pay careful attention to termination and dissolution provi-
sions, given uncertain state of law regarding partnership dissolution); see also Kaster &
Cymbler, supra note 10, at 559 (warning lawyers that courts have produced contradictory
results regarding "whether a partnership agreement is an assumable and assignable exec-
utory contract").
21. See Cardinal Indus., Inc. v. Buckeye Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re Cardinal
Indus., Inc.), 105 Bankr. 834, 849 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989); Corky Foods, 85 Bankr. at
904.
22. See supra note 13.
23. Specifically, section 365(e)(2) states:
Paragraph (I) of this subsection does not apply to an executory contract ... if -(A)(i) applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such [a] contract
... from accepting performance from or rendering performance to the trustee
or to an assignee of such contract ... and (ii) such party does not consent to
such assumption or assignment ....
11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(2) (1988) (emphasis added); see also infra text accompanying notes 52-
90 (further explaining use of section 365(e)(2)).
1991]
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counters the public policy "no dissolution" argument, and sets forth the
policy and practical reasons that favor upholding the dissolution provi-
sions of partnership agreements.
I. EXAMINING THE Two BRANCHES OF "No DISSOLUTION" CASES
Many federal courts applying the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code
have found partnerships to be dissolved by a general partner's insol-
vency.24 Some courts, however, have rejected both state law and the ac-
tual partnership agreements25 in refusing to allow dissolution upon the
bankruptcy of general partner.26 These cases generally follow two lines
of reasoning.
A. Section 365(e)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, and the Preemption of
State Partnership Law and Bankruptcy Dissolution Clauses
Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code27 enables a trustee28 or debtor in
possession 29 to assume or to reject any "executory contract"30 of the
24. Most of these courts have simply followed the black-letter partnership law of the
state under which the partnership was formed. See, e.g., Connolly v. Nuthatch Hill As-
soc. (In re Manning), 831 F.2d 205, 207 (10th Cir. 1987) ("[u]nder Colorado law, a bank-
ruptcy filing by any partner effects an automatic dissolution of the partnership"); Turner
v. Lee (In re Minton Group, Inc.), 46 Bankr. 222, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (New York part-
nership law "dictates that upon the bankruptcy of any partner, a partnership dissolves");
Holcomb v. Fulton (In re Fulton), 43 Bankr. 273, 276 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984) (part-
nership "was dissolved by operation of [Tennessee] law"); Houchen v. Gadberry (In re
Gadberry), 30 Bankr. 13, 13 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1983) (Illinois partnership law "mandates
dissolution").
25. See supra note 12.
26. This position also has been embraced by some commentators. See McBride,
Bankruptcy and Partnership Dissolution: Making a Federal Case, 1988 Norton Bankr. L.
Adv. 6, 6 (Oct. 1988); see also Kennedy, Partnership & Partners' Estates Under the Bank-
ruptcy Code, 1983 Ariz. St. L.J. 219, 261 (1983) [hereinafter Kennedy I] (filing of a Chap-
ter 11 petition by a partner should not dissolve a partnership).
27. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1988).
28. A trustee is a disinterested third party appointed to represent the debtor's estate
in a Chapter 7 liquidation case, and in some cases in a Chapter I 1 reorganization case.
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 323, 701, 702, 1104 (1988); see also Kennedy II, supra note 7, at 570-71
(discussing nature and election of trustee). The trustee is a different entity legally and
physically from the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1105 (1988) (distinguishing between
trustee and debtor or debtor in possession).
29. In a Chapter I 1 case, the debtor frequently remains in charge of administering his
or her own estate in bankruptcy, in lieu of a court-appointed trustee. See A. Hertzog &
L. King, Collier Bankruptcy Code § 1104 comment, at 585-86 (1990-91). When this
occurs, the debtor becomes known as the "debtor in possession." See id. at § 1101 com-
ment, at 572; King, supra note 7, 1101.02, at 1101-2. A debtor in possession has the
same rights and obligations as a trustee, both generally and particularly in reference to
section 365. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1988).
30. Historically, "executory contracts" include all contracts that are not completely
performed. See 1 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 1:19 at 49 (4th ed.
1990). Thus, a contract is either executory or it is fully performed; if the latter, it is no
longer a contract. See id.
The historical definition of executory contract is too broad to be useful in the bank-
ruptcy context. See T.G. Motors, Inc. v. C.M. Turtur Invs., Inc. (In re C.M. Turtur
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debtor.31 By allowing the estate representative to pick and choose
among the debtor's pre-petition agreements, the provision is designed to
assist the debtor in reorganization or liquidation.32
Section 365(e)(1) preserves executory contracts for an estate that
Invs., Inc.), 93 Bankr. 526, 534 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988), aff'd, 883 F.2d 35 (5th Cir.
1989); see also Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part 1, 57 Minn. L. Rev.
439, 450 (1973) (rejecting historical, "expansive" meaning of executory contract). The
Code, however, does not define executory contract, and significant disagreement has
arisen as to how the term should be defined for bankruptcy purposes. See generally
Fogel, supra note 10, at 344 (discussing the confusion surrounding the executory contract
in bankruptcy); Note, supra note 11, at 1029 (1984) (devoting entire article to the same).
At present, there are three basic bankruptcy definitions of "executory contract."
First, the legislative history to section 365 of the Code indicates that an executory con-
tract "generally includes contracts on which performance remains due to some extent on
both sides." H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 347 (1977) (emphasis added),
reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, 5963, 6303 [hereinafter House Re-
port]; S.R. Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 58 (1978) (emphasis added), reprinted in
1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin News 5787, 5844 [hereinafter Senate Report]; see eg.
NLRB v. Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 522 n.6 (1984) (employing this definition); Tonry v.
Herbert (In re Tonry), 724 F.2d 467, 468 (5th Cir. 1984) (same); Artz v. Rozzie Liquors,
Inc. (In re 2903 Wine & Spirits, Inc.), 45 Bankr. 1003, 1007-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (same);
In re Sharon Steel Corp., 79 Bankr. 627, 630 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987) (same); In re EES
Lambert Assoc., 62 Bankr. 328, 336 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1986) (same).
A second definition considers an executory contract to be one "under which the obliga-
tion of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that
the failure of either to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing
the performance of the other." Countryman, supra, at 460 (emphasis added). Although
recognized as a narrowing of the legislative history, see In re C.M. Turtur Investments,
Inc., 93 Bankr. at 532, the Countryman definition is the most widely embraced executory
contract definition. See, eg., Griffel v. Murphy (In re Wegner), 839 F.2d 533, 536 (9th
Cir. 1988) (applying Countryman definition); Speck v. First Nat'l Bank of Sioux Falls (In
re Speck), 798 F.2d 279, 279-80, 280 n.3 (8th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (same); Lubrizol
Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.),
756 F.2d 1043, 1045 (4th Cir. 1985) (same), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986); Leefers v.
Anderson (In re Leefers), 101 Bankr. 24, 25-26 (C.D. Ill. 1989) (same); In re Hardie, 100
Bankr. 284, 285 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1989) (same).
Finally, a minority of courts have rejected any static definition of the term "executory
contract" and have adopted a "functional" definition of the term. This approach,
founded in In re Jolly, is result-oriented and looks to the policies underlying the Bank-
ruptcy Code in determining whether a specific contract is executory. See Chattanooga
Memorial Park v. Still (In re Jolly), 574 F.2d 349, 351 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
929 (1978); see also Martin Bros. Toolmakers v. Industrial Dev. Bd. (In re Martin Bros.
Toolmakers), 796 F.2d 1435, 1439 (11th Cir. 1986) (accepting without employing the
functional analysis); Sloan v. Hicks (In re Becknell & Crace Coal Co.), 761 F.2d 319, 322
(6th Cir.) (following In re Jolly), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1006 (1985); Camp v. National
Union Fire Ins. Co. (In re Government Sec. Corp.), 101 Bankr. 343, 347-48 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1989) (same), aff'd 111 Bankr. 1007 (S.D. Fla. 1990); In re Norquist, 43 Bankr. 224,
227-28 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1984) (adopting functional approach and actually eliminating
the mutuality of obligation requirement); In re Booth, 19 Bankr. 53, 56-57 (Bankr. D.
Utah 1982) (same). See generally Weintraub & Resnick, From the Bankruptcy Courts
What is an Executory Contract? A Challenge to the Countryman Test, 15 U.C.C. LJ. 273,
273-79 (1983) (comparing functional and Countryman tests).
31. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1988).
32. See House Report, supra note 30, at 347-48, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News at 6303-04; Senate Report, supra note 30, at 59, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin News at 5844-45; see also Nimmer, supra note 1.1, at 513 ("Section
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otherwise would be terminated or modified on account of the general
partner's bankruptcy.33 Section 365(e)(1) states that an executory con-
tract may not be terminated or modified solely because a contract provi-
sion is conditioned on the commencement of a bankruptcy case34 or
because of any law providing for the same.35
The argument applying section 365(e)(1) to partnership agreements
begins with the notion that partnership agreements are executory con-
tracts. 36 Treating partnership agreements as executory contracts, cou-
pled with the fact that dissolution modifies the partnership agreement,
leads to the conclusion that section 365(e)(1) prohibits the dissolution of
a partnership on account of a general partner's bankruptcy.37 Further-
more, because the Bankruptcy Code is federal law, this "no dissolution"
argument asserts that section 365(e)(1) preempts the conflicting state
partnership law and renders any express bankruptcy dissolution clauses
unenforceable.38
365 is an integral facet of the bankrupt's ability to restructure its business operations in
an economically viable format").
This "assistance" is accomplished in two ways. First, section 365 allows for the as-
sumption of those contracts that will benefit the estate, and provides a means whereby the
debtor can force others to continue to do business with it when "a bankruptcy filing
might make them reluctant to do so." Richmond Leasing Co. v. Capital Bank, N.A., 762
F.2d 1303, 1310 (5th Cir. 1985); see In re Hardie, 100 Bankr. 284, 285 (Bankr. E.D.N.C.
1989); In re Compass Van & Storage Corp., 65 Bankr. 1007, 1010 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y
1986); In re G-N Partners, 48 Bankr. 462, 465 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985). Alternatively,
section 365 relieves the debtor's estate from burdensome or disadvantageous contractual
obligations. See In re Hardie, 100 Bankr. at 285; Silk Plants, Etc. Franchise Sys., Inc. v.
Register (In re Register), 95 Bankr. 73, 74 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.), aff'd, 100 Bankr. 360
(M.D. Tenn. 1989); In re Sun City Invs., Inc., 89 Bankr. 245, 248 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1988).
33. See supra note 13.
34. Bankruptcy clauses were enforceable under section 70(b) of the previous Bank-
ruptcy Act. See [Bankruptcy] Act of 1898, § 70(b), 30 Stat. 544, codified as amended at
11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1976) (repealed 1978); Fogel, supra note 10, at 348 n.26; Note,
supra note 11, at 1037-38.
35. See supra note 13.
36. There appears to be a consensus that partnership agreements are executory con-
tracts. See In re Priestley, 93 Bankr. 253, 258-59 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1988); Burley v. Amer-
ican Gas & Oil Investors (In re Heafitz), 85 Bankr. 274, 284 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); In
re Corky Foods Corp., 85 Bankr. 903, 904 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988); Skeen v. Harms (In re
Harms), 10 Bankr. 817, 821 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981); see also In re Sunset Developers, 69
Bankr. 710, 712-13 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1987) (finding partnership agreement to be execu-
tory contract and still finding partnership dissolved); In re Rittenhouse Carpet, Inc., 56
Bankr. 131, 132-33 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985) (assuming without analysis that partnership
agreement was executory contract covered by section 365); Kaster & Cymbler, supra note
10, at 545 (under result-oriented test, all real estate limited partnership agreements are
potentially executory); Kennedy & Smith, supra note 6, at 865-67 (discussing cases in
which courts have found partnership agreements to be executory contracts).
For the purpose of analysis, this Note assumes that partnership agreements are
executory.
37. The clearest and most succinct statement of this analysis was made by the court
in Corky Foods, 85 Bankr. at 904.
38. See supra note 15; see also Bruder v. Peaches Records and Tapes, Inc. (In re
Peaches Records and Tapes, Inc.), 51 Bankr. 583, 590 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1985) (termina-
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B. The "Public Policy Cases" and the Argument for "No Dissolution"
The second argument rejecting partnership dissolution on account of a
general partner's bankruptcy 39 exclusively concerns instances in which a
general partner files for Chapter 111 Reorganization.4 This view,
founded upon In re Safren,4" relies upon statutory construction and pub-
lic policy.
In rejecting dissolution, the Safren court stated that the applicability of
UPA section 31(5) to a partner's Chapter 11 case is an "open ques-
tion."'4 3 Because liquidation was the only existing form of bankruptcy
when the UPA was promulgated in 1914," the Safren court reasoned
that the UPA did not contemplate the application of its dissolution pro-
visions where a partner filed for Chapter 11 reorganization. 5
While the Safren court did not consider this gap in statutory history
fatal, the lack of clear legislative intent allowed the court to examine
policy concerns in determining whether UPA section 31(5) should be
extended to cover an individual partner's Chapter 11 case.46 The court
reasoned that a partner attempting to reorganize should not be faced
with the "dissolution of all the partnerships in which he is a partner," in
light of the "administrative and tax complications" that attend dissolu-
tion.4 7 In the alternative, the Safren court discerned "no benefit under
tion or modification clause that is triggered by the filing of a bankruptcy case is unen-
forceable pursuant to section 365(e)(1)); In re Texaco, Inc., 73 Bankr. 960, 964-65
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (same); In re Rittenhouse Carpet, Inc., 56 Bankr. 131, 133
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985) (same).
39. See cases cited supra note 19.
40. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1988).
41. See supra note 18.
42. 65 Bankr. 566 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986).
43. Id. at 569.
44. Reorganization, as it currently exists in Chapter 11 of the Code, did not exist until
1933, when Congress added section 77 to the Bankruptcy Act to permit the reorganiza-
tion of railroads during the depression of the 1930s. See Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 72-420,
§ 77, 47 Stat. 1467, 1474 (March 3, 1933) (amending Bankruptcy Act of 1898). General
corporate reorganization was authorized one year later by section 207 of the Bankruptcy
Act, see Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-296, § 77B, 48 Stat. 911, 912-25 (June 7, 1934)
(amending Bankruptcy Act of 1898), which later was expanded greatly into Chapters X
through XIII by the Chandler Act of 1938. See Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-696, § 101,
52 Stat. 840, 883-905 (June 22, 1938) (amending Bankruptcy Act of 1898).
45. See Safren, 65 Bankr. at 569-70; see also Kaster & Cymbler, supra note 10, at 540
(UPA does not compel dissolution where partner files a Chapter 11 petition for reorgani-
zation). But see Kennedy I, supra note 26, at 261 (although partner's Chapter 11 petition
should not dissolve the partnership, "[t]he principle of delectus personae as well as the
practical difficulties of forcing a partner to remain a member of a firm that includes a
debtor subject to the constraints of the bankruptcy laws," would enable the non-debtor
partners to object to continuing the partnership); Kennedy II, supra note 7, at 546 n. 196
("filing of a chapter I 1 petition by or against the partner should have no effect on the
continuity of the partnership unless the partnership agreement provides otherwise"). See
generally Smith, supra note 2, at 665 (discussing meaning of "bankruptcy" as used in the
UPA, ULPA and RULPA).
46. See Safren, 65 Bankr. at 569.
47. Id. at 570.
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partnership law from the automatic dissolution of a partnership upon the
filing of a [general partner's] Chapter 11 case."4
Safren and its progeny49 do not claim that Chapter 11 preempts UPA
section 31(5).5o Rather, the rationale underlying this view is that the
effects of partnership dissolution should not deter partners from seeking
the benefits of Chapter 11 reorganization.5
On their face, the arguments favoring "no dissolution" seem to be logi-
cally sound. They are not convincing, however, when examined in light
of traditional contract and partnership principles, as recognized both
without and within the Bankruptcy Code.
II. PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS As EXCEPTIONS To
CODE SECTION 365(e)(1)
In drafting section 365, Congress excepted certain types of contracts
from the section's effect.52 While section 365(e)(1) invalidates bank-
ruptcy dissolution clauses and preempts contrary state law,5" section
365(e)(2) provides that subsection (e)(1) does not apply where "applica-
ble law" excuses the non-debtor party to the contract from accepting
performance from a non-contracting party.
54
Partnership agreements clearly fall within the section 365(e)(2) excep-
tion. As executory "personal service" 55 contracts, they are the kind of
contracts for which applicable law prohibits substitute performance.
5 6
Furthermore, whether assumption of the partnership agreement is by a
trustee, a debtor in possession or an assignee, 57 such assumption will re-
sult in performance by a non-contracting party, and therefore qualifies as
prohibited substitute performance.58 Section 365(e)(2) thus liberates
48. Id.
49. See supra note 19.
50. Indeed, the Safren court specifically stated that "the Court does not reach the
issue of whether it [section 31(5)] is preempted by Chapter 11." Safren, 65 Bankr. at 570,
n.5. But see In re Corky Foods Corp., 85 Bankr. 903, 904 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988) (never-
theless construing Safren as holding that UPA section 31(5) was inconsistent with the
reorganization policies of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and hence was preempted
by federal law).
51. See Safren, 65 Bankr. at 569-70.
52. See, eg., 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)(A) (1988) (prohibiting trustee or debtor in posses-
sion from assuming or assigning an executory contract where "applicable law" excuses
the non-debtor party "from accepting performance from or rendering performance to an
entity other than the debtor or debtor in possession"); id. § 365(e)(2) (providing excep-
tion to section 365(e)(1) under same circumstances).
53. See supra text accompanying notes 13-38.
54. See supra note 23.
55. See infra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
56. See Smith, supra note 2, at 667; infra notes 61-63, 70-74 and accompanying text.
57. When a partner enters bankruptcy, only three possible scenarios relate to the po-
tential assumption of the partnership agreement. These are assumption by (i) the trustee,
(ii) the partner as debtor in possession, or (iii) by an assignee of the contract. See infra
Section 11(B).
58. See infra notes 77-89 and accompanying text.
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partnership contracts from the invalidating effects of section 365(e)(1) 9
and enables partnerships to dissolve according to state law or to the pro-
visions of their agreement.
A. Partnership Agreements as Contracts For Which "Applicable Law"
Prohibits Substitute Performance
As employed by section 365(e)(2), "applicable law" refers to non-
bankruptcy law under which contractual obligations are non-delegable.'
This language has been interpreted to preclude the assumption or assign-
ment of personal service contracts, 6' which by their nature are non-dele-
gable under the law of contracts.6'
Because of the relationship among partners, partnership agreements
are precisely the type of non-delegable, personal service contracts cov-
ered by the 365(e)(2) exception. 63 A partnership agreement creates a fi-
duciary relationship' among its members, and is a contract based upon
good faith, personal trust6' and confidence. 66 Implicit in this fiduciary
59. This argument has been employed only recently by proponents of dissolution. SeeIn re Cardinal Indus., Inc., 116 Bankr. 964, 976 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990); see also Smith,
supra note 2, at 667 (embracing application of 365(e)(2) to partnership agreements).
Although the Cardinal court in this case rejected the argument, see Cardinal, 116 Bankr.
at 981-82, its reasoning is suspect. See infra notes 87-88.
60. See In re Pioneer Ford Sales, Inc., 729 F.2d 27, 28-29 (1st Cir. 1984); PensionBenefit Guaranty Corp. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re Braniff Airways, Inc.), 700 F.2d935, 943 (5th Cir. 1983); see also In re Memphis-Friday's Assoc., 88 Bankr. 830, 834(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1988) (" 'applicable non-bankruptcy law' is state law").
61. See Secretary of the Army v. Terrace Apartments, Ltd. (In re Terrace Apts.Ltd.), 107 Bankr. 382, 384 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989); Vogel v. Borden, Inc. (In re Russell
Transfer, Inc.), 107 Bankr. 532, 534 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1989); In re Carrere, 64 Bankr.156, 158-59 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986); In re Bofill, 25 Bankr. 550, 552 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1982).
62. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 318(2), 319(2) (1981); Fogel, supra
note 10, at 351. See generally J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts § 18-28 (3d ed. 1987)(discussing non-delegable nature of personal service contracts).
63. See, eg., Kennedy I, supra note 26, at 275 ("[t]he fiduciary relationship underly-
ing a partnership agreement renders the rights and obligations thereunder nonassigna-ble"); Kennedy II, supra note 7, at 546 n.196 (although section 365(e) may nullify abankruptcy termination provision, a partnership agreement cannot be assumed or as-
signed by a partner's trustee contrary to its terms).
64. A "fiduciary relation" is "[a] relation subsisting between two persons in regard to
a business... of such a character that each must repose trust and confidence in the other
and must exercise a corresponding degree of fairness and good faith." Black's Law Dic-
tionary 626 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added); see also Restatement (Second) of Agency§§ 13, 13 comment, 14A (1958) (partner is an "agent" of partnership and therefore has a
wide range of fiduciary duties).
65. Contracts calling for a personal and/or fiduciary relationship are routinely con-
sidered to be non-delegable, personal service contracts. See J. Calamari & 1. Perillo,
supra note 62, at 761. Examples of non-delegable duties are those that "involve a closepersonal relationship, such as... an attorney to his client, or a physician to his patient."Id The same is true for contracts based on personal trust or good faith. "[lit is oftenheld that a party to a contract who has expressly or impliedly promised to act in 'good
faith' or to use his 'best efforts' may not delegate that duty." Id
66. See Skeen v. Harms (In re Harms), 10 Bankr. 817, 821 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981);
1991]
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duty to other partners is an obligation to conduct partnership affairs in
such a manner as to avoid damage to another partner's or the partner-
ship's interests. 67 A partner's fiduciary duty extends beyond dissolution
and is operative during the winding-up process.68 The duty ends only
upon the partnership's termination.69
As with all personal service contracts, partnership law unconditionally
grants non-debtor partners the right to refuse performance from a substi-
tute partner.70 Section 18(g) of the UPA provides that "[n]o person can
become a member of a partnership without the consent of all the part-
ners." 71 Similarly, under the ULPA,7z RULPA73 and relevant case
law,74 limited partners need not accept performance from a general part-
ner with whom they have not contracted.
The most significant effect of this rule against delegability is the limita-
tion on a general partner's ability to assign his or her partnership
rights.75 The weight of authority states that partners may not assign the
accord Burley v. American Gas & Oil Investors (In re Heafitz), 85 Bankr. 274, 284
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); In re Sunset Developers, 69 Bankr. 710, 713 (Bankr. D. Idaho
1987); People v. Zinke, 147 A.D.2d 106, 114, 541 N.Y.S.2d 986, 990 (1st Dep't 1989),
rev'd 76 N.Y.2d 8, 555 N.E.2d 263, 556 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1990); see also 59A Am. Jur. 2d
Partnership, §§ 420, 1333 ("courts universally recognize the fiduciary relationship of
partners and impose on them obligations of the utmost good faith and integrity in their
dealings with one another in partnership affairs"); UPA § 21, 6 U.L.A. 258 (1969)
("[e]very partner must account to the partnership"). See generally Beane, The Fiduciary
Relationship of a Partner, 5 J. Corp. L. 483 (1980) (discussing at length the fiduciary
relationships created by partnership arrangements).
67. See 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnerships, § 426 (1987). Indeed, a partner cannot act to
protect his own financial position at the expense of his partners, even in the absence of
malice. See id. § 420; accord Auld v. Estridge, 86 Misc. 2d 895, 896, 382 N.Y.S.2d 897,
898 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1976).
68. See Bromberg, supra note 2, at 649; 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnership § 431 (1987);
accord Jennison v. Bierer, 601 F. Supp. 1167, 1177 (D. Vt. 1984); Oliker v. Gershunoff,
195 Cal. App. 3d 1288, 1305, 241 Cal. Rptr. 415, 425 (Ct. App. 1987); Washington Medi-
cal Center, Inc. v. Holle, 573 A.2d 1269, 1271, 1276-77 (D.C. 1990); Woodruff v. Bryant,
558 S.W.2d 535, 542 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
69. See 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnerships § 429 (1987); accord Clear Creek, Inc. v. Royal
Am. Corp. (In re Int'l Resorts, Inc.), 46 Bankr. 405, 417 (N.D. Ala. 1984); Claude v.
Claude, 191 Or. 308, 328, 228 P.2d 776, 785 (1951).
70. See UPA § 18(g), 6 U.L.A. 213 (1969); ULPA § 9(1)(e), 6 U.L.A. 586 (1969);
RULPA § 401, 6 U.L.A. 340 (Supp. 1991); accord Johnson v. Chilcott, 599 F. Supp. 224,
227 (D. Colo. 1984); Beckerman v. Sands, 364 F. Supp. 1197, 1200 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); In
re New Era Co., 115 Bankr. 41, 44 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd, 125 Bankr. 725
(S.D.N.Y. 1991); Zoltanski v. Akst (In re Zyndorf), 80 Bankr. 876, 878 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1987); In re Sunset Developers, 69 Bankr. 710, 713 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1987); see also
59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnerships § 504 (1987) ("this restriction is an essential characteristic
of the partnership relation").
71. UPA § 18(g), 6 U.L.A. 213 (1969).
72. See ULPA § 9(l)(e), 6 U.L.A. 586 (1969).
73. See RULPA § 401, 6 U.L.A. 340 (Supp. 1991).
74. See Chaffin v. Dunn, 56 Bankr. 736, 740 (N.D. Ill. 1985); In re Priestley, 93
Bankr. 253, 260 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1988); In re Tip 0 Texas RV Village, 87 Bankr. 195,
198 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988); In re Sunset Developers, 69 Bankr. 710, 713 (Bankr. D.
Idaho 1987); Skeen v. Harms (In re Harms), 10 Bankr. 817, 821 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981).
75. A partner in a general partnership, and the general partner of a limited partner-
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right to participate in partnership management without the consent of
their fellow partners.76
"Applicable" contract and partnership law therefore prohibits the sub-
stitute performance of partnership agreements, satisfying the first re-
quirement of section 365(e)(2).
B. Assumption By a Trustee, Debtor in Possession, and/or Assignee as
Substitute Performance
The trustee of an insolvent partner's estate is a different physical and
legal person than the pre-bankruptcy partner." Consistent with the law
ship, have three types of partnership rights: (i) rights in specific partnership property; (H)
an "interest" in the partnership; and (ill) a right to participate in the management of the
partnership. See UPA § 24, 6 U.L.A. 324 (1969); see also RULPA § 403, 6 U.LA. 345
(Supp. 1991) (rights and limitations of a general partner in a limited partnership are the
same as those of a partner in a general partnership).
A partner is a co-owner of specific partnership property and holds such property as a
tenant in partnership. See UPA § 25(1), 6 U.L.A. 326 (1969). This right to specific
property is not assignable, see id. § 25(2)(G), because under the entity theory of partner-
ships, the incidents of a partner's tenancy in partnerships are "negligible." Connolly v.
Nuthatch Hill Assoc. (In re Manning), 37 Bankr. 755, 758 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1984), aff'd
in part, 831 F.2d 205 (10th Cir. 1987); accord Turner v. Lee (In re Minton Group, Inc.,
46 Bankr. 222, 224-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Venture Properties, Inc. v. Norwood Group, Inc.
(In re Venture Properties, Inc.), 37 Bankr. 175, 176 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1984). But see Ken-
nedy & Smith, supra note 6, at 839-44 (arguing that bankrupt partner should be able to
compel sale of partnership property).
An "interest" in the partnership, which is defined as a partner's "share of the profits
and surplus," is considered to be personal property of the partner. UPA § 26, 6 U.LA.
349 (1969). This interest is assignable without the consent of the other partners, although
the assignee receives no right to interfere in the management of the partnership or to
inspect the partnership books. See UPA § 27, 6 U.L.A. 353 (1969); ULPA § 19(3), 6
U.L.A. 603 (1969); RULPA § 702, 6 U.L.A. 369-70 (Supp. 1991); accord In re New Era
Co., 115 Bankr. 41, 44 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd, 125 Bankr. 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1991);
In re Priestley, 93 Bankr. at 257-58; see also Bromberg, supra note 2, 637 n.31 (assign-
ment of partner's interest is accompanied by his withdrawal from management of the
partnership).
As a corollary to this last rule, a partner's management interest is not assignable with-
out the other partners' consent. See Tip 0 Texas, 87 Bankr. at 198; Tyler v. Walde (In re
Walsh), 14 Bankr. 385, 386-87 (Bankr. D.C. 1981).
76. See supra note 75. An assignee of a partner receives only the monetary distribu-
tion to which that partner would be entitled, but does not become a partner by virtue of
the assignment. See 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnerships § 506 (1987); accord United States v.
Coson, 286 F.2d 453, 462 n.14 (9th Cir. 1961); In re New Era Co., 115 Bankr. at 44; Tip
o Texas, 87 Bankr. at 198; In re Zyndorf, 80 Bankr. 876, 877-78 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1987); Wester & Co. v. Nestle, 669 P.2d 1046, 1048 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983); Benton v.
Albuquerque Nat'l Bank, 103 N.M. 5, 10, 701 P.2d 1025, 1030 (Ct. App. 1985); Thomas
v. American Nat'l Bank, 704 S.W.2d 321, 323 (Tex. 1986).
77. The trustee must be considered a different "legal" entity than the pre-petition
partner, because any other result would undermine the fiduciary nature of partnership
arrangements. While a partner stands in a fiduciary relationship to his fellow partners,
see supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text, a trustee stands in a fiduciary relationship
to the debtor's creditors and must manage the estate to maximize their benefit. See
United States v. Aldrich (In re Rigden), 795 F.2d 727, 730 (9th Cir. 1986); Ford Motor
Credit Co. v. Weaver, 680 F.2d 451, 462 n.8 (6th Cir. 1982); Wheels, Inc. v. Otasco, Inc.
(In re Otasco, Inc.), 11 Bankr. 976, 984 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990); In re Haugen Constr.
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governing partnership contracts, 78 therefore, assumption of the partner-
ship agreement by the trustee would amount to substitute performance
and is prohibited.7 9  The same result would attach if the partnership
agreement was assumed by an unrelated assignee, because such an as-
sumption would amount to a material change in the identity of the per-
son rendering performance.80
Where the debtor in possession seeks to assume the partnership agree-
ment by continuing as a general partner, arguably this assumption also
amounts to prohibited substitute performance. Although the pre-peti-
tion debtor and debtor in possession are the same physical person,"1
courts have often treated the two as separate legal entities for bankruptcy
purposes82 because the debtor in possession not only receives the powers
Serv., Inc., 104 Bankr. 233, 239 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1989); In re Consupak, Inc., 87 Bankr.
529, 539 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988). There is thus an inherent conflict of interest in the
trustee assuming a partner's contract. See supra note 28 (defining trustee and trustee's
purpose); infra notes 81-89 and accompanying text (employing same rationale to explain
the different legal status of a pre-petition debtor and a debtor in possession).
78. See supra notes 65-76 and accompanying text.
79. This position was explained most clearly in Skeen v. Harms (In re Harms), 10
Bankr. 817, 821 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981); accord In re Cardinal Indus., Inc., 116 Bankr.
964, 979 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990); In re Fidelity Am. Fin. Corp., 43 Bankr. 74, 77
(Bankr. E.D. Pa.), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 62 Bankr. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1984);
Schefer v. CRS Architectural Metals Corp. (In re CRS Architectural Metals Corp.), 1
Bankr. 729, 731 n.2 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1979); see also Kennedy II, supra note 7, at 546
n.196 (trustee cannot assume or assign partnership agreement); Smith, supra note 2, at
667 (section 365(e) does not avoid dissolution when trustee assumes partnership
contract).
80. See Cardinal Industries, 116 Bankr. at 982; In re Sunset Developers, 69 Bankr.
710, 713 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1987); Kaster & Cymbler, supra note 10, at 549 n.70. Addi-
tionally, any assignment of the partnership agreement presupposes that the agreement
has been assumed by a bankruptcy trustee. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(2) (1988); accord
Burroughs Corp. v. Gillman (In re Electrospace Corp.), 39 Bankr. 632, 639-40 (S.D.N.Y.
1984); Cardinal Industries, 116 Bankr. at 977; In re Sapolin Paints, Inc., 20 Bankr. 497,
507 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982). Because such assumption equals substitute performance,
any assignment of the partnership contract by the trustee to a third party is perforce
invalid. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text; see also Fogel, supra note 10, at
361-62 (trustee cannot assign executory contract that he cannot assume).
81. In fact, section 1101(1) of the Bankruptcy Code defines "debtor in possession" as
simply the "debtor." See 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (1988).
82. See NLRB v. Bildisco (In re Bildisco), 682 F.2d 72, 78, 82-83 (3d Cir. 1982),
aff'd, 465 U.S. 513 (1984); Alioto v. Official Creditor Comm. (In re Pacific Far East Line,
Inc.), 654 F.2d 664, 668 (9th Cir. 1981); Boatmen's Bank of Benton v. Wiggs (In re
Wiggs), 87 Bankr. 57, 58 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1988); In re Sunset Developers, 69 Bankr. 710,
713 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1987); In re N.S. Garrott & Sons, 63 Bankr. 189, 191 (Bankr. E.D.
Ark. 1986); Velikopoljski v. Florida Nat'l Bank (In re Velikopoljski), 54 Bankr. 534, 536
n.1 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985); Blehm Land & Cattle Co. v. Wilkins (In re Blehm Land &
Cattle Co.), 38 Bankr. 648, 650 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1984); Brent Explorations, Inc. v. Karst
Enters., Inc. (In re Brent Explorations, Inc.), 31 Bankr. 745, 752 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983);
In re Harms, 10 Bankr. at 821.
The holding of the Supreme Court in National Labor Relations Board v. Bildisco,
namely that a debtor in possession is to be considered the same legal entity as the pre-
petition debtor for the purpose of rejecting a collective bargaining agreement, is distin-
guishable and does not change the foregoing analysis. See Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 528. Be-
cause of the Court's focus on rejection as opposed to assumption powers, and considering
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and rights of a trustee, 3 but actually stands in the shoes of the trustee in
every way." Thus, like a trustee, 5 a debtor in possession stands in a
fiduciary relationship to his creditors and must run the estate for their
benefit. 6 As an entity with new fiduciary allegiances and subject to the
supervision of the bankruptcy court, the insolvent partner faces an inher-
ent conflict of interest that precludes him from remaining as a general
partner 7 or from assuming the partnership agreement88 without the
that it was not dealing with a "personal service" executory contract, it did not face the
conflict-of-interest problems inherent in the assumption of a partnership contract, and
thus its application here is questionable. See Washington Medical Center, Inc. v. Holle,
573 A.2d 1269, 1278, 1280 n.17 (recognizing Bildisco while still finding the "conflict-of-
interest" reasoning to be sound where a bankrupt general partner continues to operate
the partnership).
83. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
84. See House Report, supra note 30, at 404, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News at 6360; Senate Report, supra note 30, at 116-17, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News at 5902; accord Faneli v. Hensley (In re Triangle Chemi-
cals), 697 F.2d 1280, 1284 (5th Cir. 1983); Bender & Treece, P.C. v. Storage Technology
Corp. (In re Storage Technology Corp.), 45 Bankr. 363, 365 (D. Colo. 1985); In re V.
Savino Oil & Heating Co., 99 Bankr. 518, 524 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1989); In re Watson, 94
Bankr. 111, 114 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988); Iowa-Missouri Realty Co. v. United States (In
re Iowa-Missouri Realty Co.), 86 Bankr. 617, 619 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988); In re Hum-
phreys Pest Control Franchises, Inc., 40 Bankr. 174, 176 n.5 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984).
85. See supra note 79.
86. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 355-56
(1985); Woodson v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. (In re Woodson), 839 F.2d 610, 614 (9th
Cir. 1988); In re V. Savino Oil & Heating Co., 99 Bankr. 518, 524-25 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1989); In re McClure, 69 Bankr. 282, 289 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1987); In re Executive Air
Center, Inc., 60 Bankr. 652, 654 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986); In re Paolino, 53 Bankr. 399,
401 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 60 Bankr. 828 (E.D. Pa. 1986); see also In re N.S.
Garrott & Sons, 63 Bankr. 189, 191 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1986) ("debtor-in-possession is a
fiduciary who owes undivided loyalty to the estate"); In re E. Paul Kovacs & Co., 16
Bankr. 203, 205 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981) (creditors have right to require debtor in posses-
sion to exercise powers for their benefit).
87. See In re Sunset Developers, 69 Bankr. 710, 713 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1987); Skeen v.
Harms (In re Harms), 10 Bankr. 817, 822 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981). In fact, it is well
established that a general partner ceases to be a general partner upon filing for bank-
ruptcy. See, eg., UPA §§ 33, 35(3)(b), 37, 6 U.L.A. 423, 430, 444 (1969) (eliminating
right of bankrupt partner to act on behalf of or bind partnership); RULPA § 402(4)-(5), 6
U.L.A. 341-42 (Supp. 1991) ("a person ceases to be a general partner of a limited partner-
ship upon the ... fil[ing of] a voluntary petition in bankruptcy ... [or] after the com-
mencement of any proceeding against the general partner seeking reorganization... [or]
liquidation").
One case, going against the weight of partnership law and authority, has disputed the
idea that "potential conflicts of interest" justify removal of the debtor as general partner.
See In re Cardinal Indus., Inc., 116 Bankr. 964, 984 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990). Specifi-
cally, the court stated: "it appears theoretically possible for an entity to appropriately
hold fiduciary duties to more than one group so long as the two groups' interests are not
actually adverse to one another." Id at 984 (emphasis added).
The Cardinal court's reasoning is unconvincing. First, while it is theoretically possible
to hold fiduciary duties to more than one group, this is unlikely to occur where the
groups are creditors and partners. See, e.g., House Report, supra note 30, at 198, re-
printed in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 6159 (recognizing potential conflicts
of interest where one trustee services the estates of both a bankrupt partner and partner-
ship); Kennedy I, supra note 26, at 227 (same); Kennedy II, supra note 7, at 577-78
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other partners' consent.8 9
(same); see also Washington Medical Center, Inc. v. Holle, 573 A.2d 1269, 1280 n.17
(D.C. 1990) (recognizing possibility of divided loyalties where general partner continued
to operate limited partnerships during his bankruptcy). Creditors want to reach the per-
sonal assets of the insolvent partner, which also serve as a potential source for discharg-
ing partnership liabilities. See UPA § 15, 6 U.L.A. 174 (1969) (partners' liability for
partnership debts is joint and several); Rosenberg, Partnership Reorganization Under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act. Filling in the Interstices, 56 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1173, 1179 (1981)
(because liability is joint and several, any partnership creditor may look to assets of indi-
vidual partners for satisfaction). Thus, by reducing the insolvent partner's assets, the
other partners' liability for partnership debts increases, and partnership liabilities may
remain unpaid.
Second, there is no way to predict what actions a debtor in possession will be required
to take in administering the estate. Consequently, there is no way to determine whether
those actions will be "actually adverse" to the partnership. As one commentary has
noted, conflicts of interest inevitably arise when the affairs of a partnership and any part-
ner are jointly administered in bankruptcy. See Kennedy & Smith, supra note 6, at 873
(emphasis added). Indeed, consistent with the underlying rationale of relevant partner-
ship laws and authority, see supra notes 65-76 and accompanying text, the presumption
should be that at some point those interests will conflict.
Third, the Cardinal theoretical approach does not provide a clear standard and is likely
to promote inconsistent rulings in an area greatly in need of predictability. See infra
Section III(B).
88. An interesting twist occurs where the trustee assumes the partnership agreement
and allows the insolvent partner to continue to perform as general partner subject to the
trustee's supervision. This was the situation in In re Cardinal Industries, which took the
position that because performance will be rendered by the same entity that was a party to
the contract, the non-debtor party was not prejudiced, nor the "essential bargain" af-
fected by the assumption. 116 Bankr. at 981-82.
The Cardinal decision contravenes well-settled principles that allow partners to reject
performance by a substitute partner. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text. It
also undercuts its own reasoning by admitting that performance will be rendered by the
debtor partner "as managed by the Trustee." Cardinal, 116 Bankr. at 981. Under the
trustee's management, the bankrupt partner's performance will not be the same as prior
to the bankruptcy, because the debtor will no longer be able to exercise independent
discretion in making partnership management decisions. Even more importantly, the
scenario envisioned in Cardinal is fraught with the same inherent conflicts of interest as
when the debtor in possession attempts to perform the partnership contract. See supra
notes 83-87 and accompanying text. As the Cardinal court actually stated, the "debtor,
whether in possession of the estate or being managed by an operating trustee, acts for
different interests than it acted for prior to the filing.... [namely] for the benefit of the
creditor body." Cardinal, 116 Bankr. at 981 (emphasis added); see also Fanelli v. Hens-
ley (In re Triangle Chemicals, Inc.), 697 F.2d 1280, 1290 (5th Cir. 1983) (no distinction
exists between "debtor" and "debtor in possession" with regards to acts performed on its
behalf subsequent to filing of reorganization petition); In re Chapel Gate Apartments,
Ltd., 64 Bankr. 569, 575-76 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986) (same).
89. In In re Harms, the court pursued a similar line of reasoning in finding that a
limited partnership was dissolved by the filing of a bankruptcy petition by its general
partner. See Skeen v. Harms (In re Harms), 10 Bankr. 817, 821-22 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1981). The court held a partnership dissolved for lack of a general partner, because the
debtor ceased to be general partner upon bankruptcy, and because neither trustee nor
debtor in possession could assume "personal service" partnership agreement. See id. Un-
like the present analysis, however, the Harms court relied upon Code section 365(c). See
id. At that time, section 365(c) prohibited the assumption or assignment of certain exec-
utory contracts under terms identical to the present version of section 365(e)(2). Com-
pare 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1) (1979) with 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(2) (1988).
In 1984, section 365(c)(1) was amended to state that a trustee may not assume an
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Partnership agreements meet both elements of section 365(e)(2). The
section therefore removes partnership agreements from the invalidating
effect of section 365(e)(1), and allows partnerships to be dissolved under
the terms of the contract or according to state partnership law as incor-
porated by the contract.9'
executory contract if applicable law excuses the non-debtor party from accepting per-
formance from "an entity other than the debtor or the debtor in possession." I I U.S.C.
§ 365(c)(1)(A) (1988) (emphasis added). Although the section still precludes the trustee
or an assignee from becoming a substitute general partner, one case has read the amend-
ment as providing that a debtor partner can assume a partnership agreement, so long as
that partner continues to perform either as debtor in possession or under the supervision
of the trustee. See In re Cardinal Indus., Inc., 116 Bankr. 964, 979 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1990). Another court, however, has reached the opposite conclusion. Reading the
amendment literally, this court argued that if non-bankruptcy law prohibits assignment
to a third party (i.e. to someone "other than the debtor or debtor in possession"), then
neither the trustee nor the debtor in possession can assume the contract under section
365(c). See In re West Elec., Inc., 852 F.2d 79, 83-84 (3d Cir. 1988). Thus, under this
interpretation, it makes no difference who ultimately assumes the partnership contract,
and In re Harms is still good law. See, eg., In re Sunset Developers, 69 Bankr. 710, 713
(Bankr. D. Idaho 1987) (following Harms and arguing that section 365(c) still prevents a
debtor in possession from assuming or assigning a partnership contract).
Even if the first analysis of section 365(c) is correct, the argument of this Note under
section 365(e)(2) does not suffer the same fate as the In re Harms analysis. Unlike section
365(c)(1), which was the basis of the Harms reasoning, section 365(e)(2) has not been
amended. Furthermore, dissolution under section 365(e)(2) is not dependant upon the
absence of a general partner within the limited partnership. Rather, because section
365(e)(2) renders section 365(e)(1) inapplicable, dissolution occurs under the state law
equivalent of UPA section 31(5) or by the explicit terms of the partnership agreement.
This argument actually expands the result in Harms to include general as well as limited
partnerships.
90. Because this reasoning is based on a statutory interpretation of the language of
section 365(e) and avoids a conflict between state partnership law and the federal Bank-
ruptcy Code, the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution is not implicated.
There is, however, a question as to whether dissolution (and hence ultimate termina-
tion of the agreement) can occur immediately or must overcome the restrictions of the
Code's automatic stay provisions. See I 1 U.S.C. § 362 (1988).
Some cases have argued that because executory contracts do not automatically vest in
the bankrupt's estate and must be assumed by the trustee or debtor in possession, they are
not stayed by section 362. See Tonry v. Herbert (In re Tonry), 724 F.2d 467, 468-69 (5th
Cir. 1984); In re Bofill, 25 Bankr. 550, 552 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re New Town
Mall, 17 Bankr. 326, 329 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1982). But see Computer Communications, Inc.
v. Codex, Inc. (In re Computer Communications, Inc.), 824 F.2d 725, 730 (9th Cir. 1987)
(rejecting this position explicitly); Wegner Farms Co. v. Merchants Bonding Co. (In re
Wegner Farms Co.), 49 Bankr. 440, 444-45 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1985) (same). Similarly,
another line of cases has held that a contract for personal services is excluded from the
estate of the debtor by virtue of Code sections 541(a)(6) and 365(c), and hence the trustee
or debtor in possession obtains no "legally cognizable interest" in the contract. See In re
West Elec., Inc., 852 F.2d 79, 83-84 (3d Cir. 1988); Ford, Bacon & Davis, Inc. v. Hola-
han, 311 F.2d 901, 904 (5th Cir. 1962), cert denied 373 U.S. 913; In re Carrere, 64
Bankr. 156, 158-59 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986); Bofill, 25 Bankr. at 552; In re Noonan, 17
Bankr. 793, 797-78 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); see also 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (1988) (ex-
cluding from estate post-petition proceeds from personal service contracts); 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(c)(1) (1988) (precluding trustee from assuming or assigning personal service con-
tract). Under either line of cases, then, the remaining non-debtor partners would be free
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III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND AN ARGUMENT FOR
PREDICTABILITY
Despite the reasoning of the Safren court,9 the more persuasive policy
to wind up the partnership and terminate the agreement without the automatic stay re-
striction. See Smith, supra note 2, at 666; Kennedy I, supra note 26, at 258-59 n. 146.
In contrast, many cases have held that executory contract rights are property of the
debtor that are included in the bankruptcy estate. See In re Herschell, 43 Bankr. 680, 682
(Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1984); In re Coast Trading Co., 26 Bankr. 737, 740 (Bankr. D. Or.
1982). Under this interpretation, cancellation or termination of such a contract is prohib-
ited by the automatic stay as an "act to obtain possession of property of the estate."
Coast Trading, 26 Bankr. at 740 (quoting language of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3)); accord
Computer Communications, 824 F.2d at 728-31; In re American Cent. Airlines, Inc., 52
Bankr. 567, 570 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1985). Under this approach, even if the non-debtor
party has a valid reason for terminating the contract, such as where the contract cannot
be assumed by the trustee or debtor in possession, it can only be terminated pursuant to
the terms of the automatic stay provision. See Computer Communications, Inc., 824 F.2d
at 730; Wegner Farms, 49 Bankr. at 444; see also 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1) (1988) (providing
that interest of debtor in property is part of debtor's estate notwithstanding any contrac-
tual provision or non-bankruptcy law).
Despite this second group of cases, non-debtor partners should be able to obtain relief
from the automatic stay. Code section 362(d)(1) allows the bankruptcy court to grant
relief from the automatic stay to a "party in interest" for "cause, including the lack of
adequate protection." 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (1988). "Cause is an intentionally broad and
flexible concept... [designed] to permit the courts to respond ... to inherently fact-
sensitive situations." In re Sentry Park, Ltd., 87 Bankr. 427, 430 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1988); accord Norton v. Hoxie State Bank, 61 Bankr. 258, 260 (D. Kan. 1986); Rich v.
Maryland Nat'l Bank, 42 Bankr. 350, 354 (D. Md. 1984); In re Ashton, 63 Bankr. 244,
247 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1986). As such, courts exercising bankruptcy jurisdiction may rec-
ognize equitable and due process principles, including the impact of the stay on non-
debtor parties, in fashioning relief. See Scrima v. John Devries Agency, 103 Bankr. 128,
132 (W.D. Mich. 1989); General Data Corp. v. Phelia Assoc. (In re Phelia Assoc.), 17
Bankr. 66, 69 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981). Non-debtor partners should be able to obtain
relief from the automatic stay for cause. See, e.g., In re Priestley, 93 Bankr. 253, 261-62
(Bankr. D.N.M. 1988) (court lifted stay to allow limited partners to remove general part-
ner and wind-up partnership). Applying the automatic stay to the partnership agreement
would prohibit the remaining partners from making any managerial decisions regarding
the partnership, because any such decision is likely to affect the debtor partner's "inter-
est" in the partnership and would constitute interference with the estate's property.
Freezing the partnership's operations in this manner harms both the overall partnership
and the individual partners' interests. This is particularly so because a partner's individ-
ual bankruptcy case does not stay actions on partnership obligations or against property
owned by the partnership. See Turner v. Lee (In re Minton Group, Inc.), 46 Bankr. 222,
225 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Fairfield Group Partnership, 69 Bankr. 318, 320 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1987); Venture Properties, Inc. v. Norwood Group, Inc. (In re Venture Properties,
Inc.), 37 Bankr. 175, 176 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1984); Dominican Fathers of Winona v. Dreske
(In re Dreske), 25 Bankr. 268, 271 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1982). Additionally, Congress did
not intend the stay to apply to such situations. See Senate Report, supra note 30, at 52,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 5838. Indeed, as stated in the
legislative history: "Generally, proceedings in which the debtor is a fiduciary ... need
not be stayed because they bear no relationship to the purpose of the automatic stay,
which is protection of the debtor and his estate from his creditors." Id.; accord
Holtkamp v. Littlefield (In re Holtkamp), 669 F.2d 505, 508-09 (7th Cir. 1982); see also
Computer Communications, 824 F.2d at 729 (automatic stay is meant "to give the debtor
a breathing spell from creditors").
91. See supra notes 43-48. The Safren court reasoned that the potential administra-
tive and tax complications resulting from dissolution would deter partners from seeking
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reasons allow the partnership to dissolve according to the terms of the
partnership agreement. This approach relies on the interrelated notions
(i) that the fiduciary nature of the partnership relation requires that part-
ners receive the full benefit of their bargain, and (ii) that predictability is
a substantive goal of contract and partnership law and must be protected.
A. Protecting the Terms of the Contract
A partnership is among the most intimate of all business relation-
ships.92 It is an association of co-owners,9 3 formed by consent' and im-
reorganization. See In re Safren, 65 Bankr. 566, 569-70 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986). It is
difficult, however, to discern the complications to which the Safren court was referring.
From an administrative standpoint, dissolution of the partnership arguably simplifies the
insolvent partner's affairs. Because dissolution terminates the ability of the debtor part-
ner to act on behalf of the partnership and allows only the non-bankrupt partners to wind
up its affairs, see supra note 2, the debtor partner (as debtor in possession) can concen-
trate on marshalling assets and effecting reorganization. Furthermore, because dissolu-
tion may lead to termination of the partnership, or to the purchase of the debtor's
partnership interest, it also may require a determination of the debtor's partnership inter-
est, and hence contribute to a more effective reorganization. For a discussion of the post-
dissolution rights and liabilities of general partners, see UPA §§ 34, 36, 38, 40, 6 U.LA.
427, 436, 456-57, 468-69 (1969).
As for tax consequences, the Internal Revenue Code provides that a partnership con-
tinues to exist until it is "terminated," or more specifically, until (i) "no part of any
business, financial operation, or venture of the partnership continues to be carried on by
any of its partners," or (ii) 50% or more of the partnership capital and profits are sold
within a twelve-month period. See 26 U.S.C. § 708 (1988). This provision clearly indi-
cates that a partnership is not terminated for tax purposes merely because it is dissolved.
See W. McKee, W. Nelson & R. Whitmire, Federal Taxation of Partnerships and Part-
ners 12.01, at S12-3 (abr. ed. cum. supp. 1989) (emphasis added). Thus, dissolution of
the partnership is a non-event under tax law, producing no immediate adverse tax conse-
quences. See Bromberg, supra note 2, at 644, 659. Furthermore, because only what
follows dissolution produces tax consequences, it is significant that few post-dissolution
scenarios have adverse effects upon the debtor partner. For example, even a nominal
amount of continuing business or financial activity prevents a partnership from terminat-
ing for tax purposes, even if its primary purpose has been abandoned. See McKee, supra,
12.02, at S12-4. In fact, the continuation of a partnership business by a newly organ-
ized partnership may avoid a "termination" of the prior partnership if the two entities
have any common partners. See 26 U.S.C. § 708(b)(l)(A) (1988); McKee, supra, 12.02,
at S12-5. In addition, there are no new tax consequences where the partnership is contin-
ued and the debtor partner retains a partnership interest. Bromberg, supra note 2, at 660.
The debtor simply continues to be taxed upon the basis of his "distributive share." See 26
U.S.C. §§ 701, 702 (1988); see also Bromberg, supra note 2, at 663-64 (where partnership
buys out debtor's interest in partnership, it is generally at book value and is principally
tax free). In the rare event that the partnership is terminated, the tax consequences still
may have a beneficial or neutral effect. See McKee, supra, 12.01, at S12-3 to -4. For a
detailed discussion of the tax consequences of termination, see ia 12.05, at S12-19 to -
38.
92. See M. Volz, C. Trower & D. Reiss, The Drafting of Partnership Agreements XV
(1986).
93. See UPA § 6, 6 U.L.A. 22 (1969).
94. See Beane, supra note 66, at 483; see also 2 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of
Contracts § 307A, at 448 (3d ed. 1959) ("a partnership is created and exists only by
mutual agreement of the partners").
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bued with fiduciary obligation.9" It is, in short, the business form most
closely resembling a "family" 96 or marriage.97
The partnership agreement controls the partnership's intra-family rela-
tionship. 98 Like all contracts, the partnership agreement presupposes
that the parties have exercised their free will, chosen the parties with
whom they wish to contract and defined the significant terms of the con-
tract for themselves.9 9 Because of the fiduciary nature of the partnership
relation, the most important elements of this "freedom of contract" in-
clude the partner's ability to determine when the partnership will dis-
solve, and under what circumstances a new member will be permitted to
join the partnership family. Thus, when courts nullify dissolution clauses
or allow the trustee or debtor in possession to assume a partnership
agreement, they violate the expectations of the non-debtor partners and
arguably undermine the established notions of freedom of contract and
enjoying the benefit of one's bargain."°°
A second problem in allowing the insolvent partner to avoid dissolu-
tion and to retain management interests in the partnership is that such a
result does not adequately protect the interests of the non-debtor part-
ners. The debtor partner, whether in possession or not, 10' owes a fiduci-
ary obligation to his creditors and must manage the estate for their
benefit. 10 2 This inherent conffict of interest both prejudices and compli-
cates the insolvent partner's management abilities, 0  and can easily
95. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
96. See M. Volz, supra note 92, at XV.
97. See In re Sovereign Group, 1984-21 Ltd., 88 Bankr. 325, 329 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1988).
98. See M. Volz, supra note 92, at XV.
99. See, e.g., J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 62, at 6, 338 (contract law is pre-
mised upon parties "hammering out an agreement" and on the notion of free will); Nim-
mer, supra note 11, at 514-15 (underlying premise of legal system is the promotion of
voluntary contracts, which "is best promoted when the parties are able to define signifi-
cant terms of the contract themselves").
100. The position taken here is not that Congress or the courts interpreting the Code
lack the power to impair partnership agreements, but simply that they should not do so
for the reasons discussed. Congress may in fact pass laws pursuant to its bankruptcy
authority that impair or alter contractual obligations. See United States v. Credithrift of
Am., Inc. (In re Webber), 674 F.2d 796, 802 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1086
(1982); Security Pacific Fin. Corp. v. Barto (In re Barto), 8 Bankr. 145, 149 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1981), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Security Pacific Fin. Co., 704 F.2d 142 (4th
Cir. 1983). As one court has recognized, however, "[iun the interest of public policy and
in order to preserve the special nature and character of partnerships, the Court will up-
hold the sanctity of partnership agreements." In re Sovereign Group, 1984-21 Ltd., 88
Bankr. 325, 329 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988).
101. See supra note 88.
102. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
103. Specifically, a bankrupt general partner must marshall the assets of his personal
estate, take action under the supervision of the bankruptcy court, answer to creditors,
and possibly defend a number of adversarial disputes. These pressures not only create
physical barriers to the continued effective management of the partnership, but also le-
gally hamper the debtor partner's ability to manage the partnership for the other part-
ners' benefit. See Kennedy & Smith, supra note 6, at 914; see also id. at 873 ("the
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harm the non-debtor partners."°
Both courts and commentators have repeatedly recognized the need to
balance the rights of the debtor and non-debtor parties to contracts, 0 5
even when protecting the non-debtor partners infringes on the debtor
partner's estate." 6 In addition, protecting the non-debtor partner's in-
terest is not only a consideration of partnership law;'o0 it is also a recog-
nized part of the Bankruptcy Code. 08 For example, Code section
365(e)(2) 9 gives effect to bankruptcy termination clauses and similar
state laws in the area of personal service contracts. 110 In fact, the legisla-
conflicts of interest that inevitably arise when the affairs of a partnership or any partner
are being administered under the bankruptcy laws generate disputes and litigation and
make efficient administration impossible") (emphasis added).
104. See, eg., In re Rittenhouse Carpet, Inc., 56 Bankr. 131, 132-34 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1985) (debtor general partner attempted to bind limited partnership to unfavorable lease,
which would have benefited debtor's estate); Holcomb v. Fulton (In re Fulton), 43 Bankr.
273, 275-76 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984) (debtor general partner attempted to secure part-
nership asset for personal estate); CP Yorketown, Inc. v. Fidelity Am. Mortgage Co. (In
re Fidelity Am. Mortgage), 10 Bankr. 781, 783 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981) (limited partners
sought to replace debtor general partner for wrongful diversion of partnership assets to
itself); Washington Medical Center v. Holle, 573 A.2d 1269, 1279-80 (D.C. 1990) (debtor
general partner found to have breached fiduciary responsibility to limited partners by
selling partnership real estate for personal estate use); see also Kennedy & Smith, supra
note 6, at 914 (it is common for a debtor partner to pay separate creditors from partner-
ship borrowing).
105. See, eg., In re Libson Shops, Inc., 24 Bankr. 693, 695 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1982)
(court must "balance the congressional intent [behind the Bankruptcy Code] with the
parties' right to rely on the enforceability of a bargained-for agreement"); In re Lafayette
Radio Elec. Corp., 12 Bankr. 302, 307 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (court must consider
whether rights of other parties to contract are receiving "due recognition and protection"
before allowing assumption); Nimmer, supra note 11, at 522 (Section 365 must balance
the "internal goals" of bankruptcy including debtor rehabilitation "with general contract
law policies that encourage or reinforce [the] use of contractual relationships"); Rosen-
berg, supra note 87, at 1207 (Chapter 11 does not create a right of successful reorganiza-
tion in all cases, but only in appropriate cases where "competing principles of public
policy are not unduly prejudiced").
106. See, eg., In re Todd, 118 Bankr. 432, 434 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1989) (upholding non-
debtor partner's first purchase right of debtor partner's interest because non-debtor part-
ner "has a legitimate interest in the identity of his partner"); In re Sunset Developers, 69
Bankr. 710, 712-13 (Bankr D. Idaho 1987) (not allowing insolvent partner to file involun-
tary bankruptcy petition against partnership).
107. See, eg., UPA § 31(5), 6 U.L.A. 376 (1969) (requiring dissolution of the partner-
ship upon bankruptcy of a partner); RULPA §§ 402(4), 402(5), 801, 6 U.L.A. 342, 375
(Supp. 1991) (same, for limited partnerships); UJPA § 33, 6 U.LA. 423-24 (1969) (termi-
nating authority of insolvent partners to act on behalf of the partnership); UPA § 27, 6
U.L.A. 353 (1969) (assignee of partnership interest receives no management rights);
ULPA § 19(3), 6 U.L.A. 603 (1969) (same, for limited partnerships); see also In re Tip 0
Texas RV Village, 87 Bankr. 195, 198 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988) (partnership law con-
strains the incoming assignee partner "in order to protect the partnership and unsuspect-
ing partners from calamity").
108. See, eg., 11 U.S.C. § 365(c) (1988) (not allowing assumption of executory per-
sonal services contracts); id § 365(e)(2) (validating ipso facto clauses in personal service
contracts); id § 362(d) (granting relief from automatic stay for a party in interest).
109. Id § 365(e)(2).
110. See supra note 23.
1991]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
tive history discussing section 365(e)11' directs courts to withhold ap-
proval of the assumption of an agreement under section 365(a) 1 2 if the
performance to be rendered will fail to give the non-bankrupt party the
benefit of his bargain." 3 Considering the personal service nature and
fiduciary obligations' 14 of partnerships, in conjunction with the potential
conflict-of-interest problems1 5 created by non-party assumption, it is un-
likely that the trustee or debtor in possession will be able to guarantee his
performance or assure the non-debtors' benefit of the bargain. 116 Fur-
thermore, the non-debtor partners not only lose a term for which they
bargained; they also remain bound by an agreement that they likely
would have rejected without the termination clause." 7
Balancing provisions similar to those of section 365(e)(2) are found in
section 365(c),' 18 which prohibits the assumption of executory personal
service contracts, and section 362(d),119 which grants relief from the au-
tomatic stay to a party in interest. 120
A third problem with a rule invalidating dissolution is that it extends
or imposes a fiduciary relationship upon the non-debtor partners, who
are likely to object to such an imposition. This rule is particularly troub-
lesome because it forces non-debtor partners to remain in the partnership
111. 11 U.S.C. § 365(e) (1988).
112. Id. § 365(a).
113. The legislative history states in relevant part:
[Section 365(e)] will require the courts to be sensitive to the rights of the
nondebtor party to executory contracts .... If the trustee is to assume a con-
tract or lease, the courts will have to insure that the trustee's performance under
the contract... gives the other contracting party the full benefit of his bargain.
House Report, supra note 30, at 348, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
at 6304-05 (emphasis added); Senate Report, supra note 30, at 59, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News at 5845 (emphasis added).
114. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 77-79, 84-88, 101-104 and accompanying text.
116. See, eg., Note, supra note 11, at 1058 ("trustee cannot adequately assure perform-
ance of a unique personal services contract").
One commentator has suggested that a non-debtor party can protect himself by specifi-
cally defining the performance expected from the debtor, and thereby requiring the
trustee or debtor in possession to act accordingly. See Fogel, supra note 10, at 350. This
idea fails for partnership contracts, because the potential performance of a partner (and
thereafter the trustee or debtor in possession) is impossible to define or predict, and the
personal service and fiduciary nature of partnership agreements renders substitute per-
formance unacceptable. See supra notes 63-74 and accompanying text. Further, while it
is possible for the non-debtor party to protect himself by terminating the contract when
the debtor's bankruptcy is imminent, see Fogel, supra note 10, at 350-51, such a policy
would provide non-debtor partners with the Hobson's choice of terminating a viable go-
ing concern, or enduring a potentially damaging assumption of the agreement.
117. One commentator has stated in the context of non-ipso-facto dissolution clauses
that such a result "could not run more contrary to the Congressional desire that courts
assure the nonbankrupt party the full benefit of his bargain." Note, supra note 11, at
1055.
118. 11 U.S.C. § 365(c) (1988).
119. Id. § 362(d) (1988).
120. For a discussion of the effect of the automatic stay and section 362(d) on partner
bankruptcy and partnership dissolution, see supra note 90.
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relationship and to incur liability for unwanted partnership expenses.
Such a result violates fundamental precepts of partnership 12 1 and con-
tract 122 law, and is not supported by bankruptcy policy."~
There is little to indicate that allowing dissolution or termination of
the insolvent partner's management rights would seriously impair the re-
organization prospects of the debtor partner, and thereby contradict the
policy underlying Chapter 11.124 Under section 541 of the Code, the
commencement of a bankruptcy action causes all "legal or equitable in-
terests" of the debtor to become property of the debtor's estate. 12 These
interests unquestionably include the debtor partner's right to receive a
portion of the partnership's profits and surplus.' 26 If the underlying
business is profitable, the remaining partners will most likely try to con-
121. It is fundamental that a partnership is terminable at the will of any partner. See
UPA §§ 31(1)(b), 31(1)(c), 31(2), 6 U.L.A. 376 (1969); ULPA § 20, 6 U.LA. 604 (1969);
RULPA §§ 602, 603, 6 U.L.A. 362-63 (Supp. 1991); Smith, supra note 2, at 667; see also
2 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 307A, at 447 (3d ed. 1957) (personal
element is of utmost importance in partnerships, and partners cannot be compelled to
continue in the relationship).
122. As a rule, "a bankruptcy court may not extend a contract beyond its original
terms." In re Advent Corp., 24 Bankr. 612, 614 (Bankr. Ist Cir. 1982); accord White
Motor Corp. v. Nashville White Trucks, Inc. (In re Nashville White Trucks, Inc.), 5
Bankr. 112, 117 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980). If a non-debtor party had a right to terminate
the arrangement, that right survives the bankruptcy of the other contracting party. See
Thompson v. Texas Mexican Ry., 328 U.S. 134, 142 (1946). Furthermore, promises to
render personal services are not specifically enforced as a rule. See Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 367(1) (1981). Some courts and commentators have suggested that requir-
ing the non-debtor partners to continue the partnership with a substitute partner may
amount to involuntary servitude in violation of the thirteenth amendment. See In re
Noonan, 17 Bankr. 793, 797-99 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra
note 62, § 16-5 at 666; Kennedy & Smith, supra note 6, at 860, see also U.S. Const.
amend. XIII, § 2 ("[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude... shall exist within the
United States").
123. It is "difficult to argue that bankruptcy policy warrants a categorical approach
that in effect commits any [partner] ... to a permanent and irrevocable relationship at the
option of any partner who becomes a debtor under the bankruptcy laws[,]" nor is it the
"function of bankruptcy law ... to impose relationships on persons." Kennedy & Smith,
supra note 6, at 872-73, 916; see also In re Waldron, 36 Bankr. 633, 638 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1984) (Section 365(c) carries out bankruptcy policy against use of "legal compulsion" to
force a non-debtor party to accept or render personal services from or to the debtor or the
trustee).
124. One court has taken the opposite position. See In re Cardinal Indus., Inc., 116
Bankr. 964, 982 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990).
125. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988).
126. While opinion differs on whether the management rights of a partner become part
of the debtor's estate in bankruptcy, the sounder position is consistent with partnership
law, and holds that such rights are non-assignable. See In re Priestley, 93 Bankr. 253,
259 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1988); L. Cherkis & L. King, Collier Real Estate Transactions and
the Bankruptcy Code, 4-60.1 (1990); see also supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text
(discussing partnership rights in general and non-assignability of management rights in
particular). But see In re Cardinal Indus., Inc. 116 Bankr. 964, 982 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1990) (property of estate includes right to manage); Quarles House Apartments v.
Plunkett (In re Plunkett), 23 Bankr. 392, 394 (Bankr. ED. Wis. 1982) (same).
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tinue the partnership as a going concern127 rather than to proceed from
dissolution to termination.12 This continuation may offer the debtor
partner a choice in maximizing the return on his partnership interest; the
debtor partner can retain the partnership interest and continue to receive
the proceeds from partnership, 29 or he can consent to a buy-out of his
interest by the remaining partners130 or a third party.' Where the part-
nership is unprofitable, however, the partners may follow dissolution
through to termination or have the partnership file for bankruptcy pro-
tection.1 32 In either event, because the non-debtor partners will want to
127. "As a practical matter, dissolution no longer occurs in many large partnerships."
59A Am. Jur. 2d, Partnership § 892 (1990).
128. The non-dissolving partners have a right to continue the partnership under both
state partnership law, see UPA § 38(2)(b), 6 U.L.A. 456 (1969); ULPA § 20, 6 U.L.A.
604 (1969); RULPA § 801(4), 6 U.L.A. 375 (Supp. 1991), as well as under most partncr-
ship agreements. See Kennedy II, supra note 7, at 537 n.154; see also Bromberg, supra
note 2, at 653 (UPA give partners a wide choice in formulating continuation agreements);
59A Am. Jur. 2d, Partnership § 892 (1987) (causes of dissolution do not preclude the
remaining partners from continuing the partnership); In re Gibson, 67 Bankr. 957, 963
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986) ("there is no sensible policy reason to require the liquidation,
and hence, the sacrifice of a going concern when its owners are happy").
129. This result is consistent with the law of partnerships, which allows a partner to
assign his right to receive the profits and surplus of a partnership without the consent of
the other partners. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text. Where the debtor is
the general partner of a limited partnership, the debtor's interest can simply be converted
from a general to a limited interest. See, e.g., In re Ancor Exploration Co., 30 Bankr.
802, 804-05 (N.D. Okla. 1983) (court upheld limited partnership agreement that provided
for conversion of general partner to limited partner upon bankruptcy); L. Cherkis & L.
King, supra note 126, § 4.07 at 4-61 (economic rights of a bankrupt general partner can
be protected by transformation into a limited partner's interest).
In some cases, as where the debtor partner's expertise or management skills are crucial
to success, the non-debtor partners may actually consent to the debtor continuing as a
general partner. This is always an option under section 365(c) and 365(e)(2). See 11
U.S.C. §§ 365(c)(1)(B), 365(e)(2)(A)(ii) (1988).
130. See, e.g., Normandin v. Normandin (In re Normandin), 106 Bankr. 14, 15
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1989) (partners may control by agreement method for determining
price to be paid to outgoing partner); Connolly v. Nuthatch Hill Assoc. (In re Manning),
37 Bankr. 755, 760 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1984) (upholding provision of partnership agree-
ment allowing non-debtor partners to purchase partnership interest of partner causing
dissolution), aff'd in part, 831 F.2d 205 (10th Cir. 1987); see also Eibl, supra note 6, at 38
n.5 (partners can avoid dissolution by purchasing the entire partnership interest of the
debtor partner). See generally, Kennedy & Smith, supra note 6, at 829-32 (discussing
enforceability of buy-out provisions in partnership agreements).
Furthermore, should the partner consent to a buy-out by the remaining partners, the
law clearly provides that the debtor partner must receive a fair price for his share. See
RULPA § 604, 6 U.L.A. 364 (Supp. 1991); see also In re Gibson, 67 Bankr. 957, 964
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986) (partners must "agree on a fair settlement of their interests");
Bromberg, supra note 2, at 668 (suggesting that continuation agreements can protect
debtor partner even further by providing for "such vital tax features as the timing,
amount, and character" of the outgoing partner's share); Kaster & Cymbler, supra note
10, at 555 (although courts will enforce buy-out provisions, they must "carefully scruti-
nize the fairness of the buy-out price to be paid to the estate")(quoting L. Cherkis & L.
King, supra note 126, at 4-58).
131. See supra note 129.
132. Unless the partnership is experiencing financial difficulties, the non-debtor part-
ners have little incentive to seek termination, because a partner is not entitled to demand
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maximize the value of their own partnership interests, the debtor part-
ner's economic interests remain aligned with those of the remaining part-
ners and will be adequately protected.' 33 To the extent that the debtor's
reorganization interests are impaired by dissolution and the loss of man-
agement rights, such impairment does not outweigh the non-debtor part-
ners' interests in receiving the bargained-for benefits of the partnership
agreement. 1
34
B. Ensuring Predictability
Predictability is a substantive goal of both contract and partnership
law. 135 Predictability requires that parties entering a contract anticipate
certain events and expect to rely upon the terms of the contract should
those events occur. 1 3 6
Decisions nullifying dissolution provisions of partnership contracts
damage the predictability of those agreements. In light of the current
state of the law, it is hard to tell whether the dissolution 37 and non-
assignability138 provisions of partnership agreements will be enforced.
and receive an interest in the liquidating partnership until after all assets are liquidated
and all partnership debts are paid. See UPA § 40(b), 6 U.L.A. 469 (1969).
133. Should the debtor partner believe that winding-up by the non-debtor partners will
prejudice his partnership interest, he can obtain judicially supervised liquidation if cause
can be shown. See UPA § 37, 6 U.L.A. 444 (1969).
134. Put simply, a "bankruptcy filing may alter the fundamental elements of a bargain
by changing the parties involved." Nimmer, supra note 11, at 537. The only "appropri-
ate" remedy is to "release" the non-bankrupt party and allow him to "re-assess the con-
tinued desirability of the agreement in light of the changed circumstances." l; see also
Kennedy & Smith, supra note 6, at 915-16 (suggesting an amendment to section 365
allowing state partnership law and the partnership agreement to control questions of dis-
solution and assumption of the partnership agreement).
135. Because parties normally will not enter into a contract if they are unable to fore-
see accurately their rights and liabilities under the contract, predictability is a prime ob-
jective of contract law. See Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 187 comment e
(1971). This objective manifests itself in two ways. First, parties will seek predictability
in the contractual formation stage, by defining rights and allocating risks (such as a part-
ner's bankruptcy) in as clear and as comprehensive a manner as possible. Second, pre-
dictability requires that parties be able to rely upon their agreement. To the extent that
courts do not honor the provisions of such agreements or of applicable law, uncertainty
replaces predictability, with the result that the incentive for certain contractual formula-
tions disappears and commerce breaks down. See Comment, Lender Liability for Breach
of the Obligation of Good Faith Performance, 36 Emory L.J. 917, 970 (1987); see also
Goetz & Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between
Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 261, 301 (1985) (an important
goal of contract drafters is "to create a contract that a court will interpret in a predictable
way").
136. As one commentator has explained, "a set of voluntary decisions and negotiations
precede the creation of the underlying contract. These negotiations and decisions are
influenced by the perceived risks of the proposed transaction, including the risk that one
party will file [for] bankruptcy." Nimmer, supra note 11, at 507.
137. Compare cases upholding partnership dissolution, supra note 9, with cases not
allowing dissolution, supra note 12.
138. Compare In re Tip 0 Texas RV Village, 87 Bankr. 195, 198 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1988) (holding that partner's management interest is not assignable); Tyler v. Walde (In
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On a practical level, this has created significant confusion for partners
and partnership drafters alike. 1 3 9
Non-dissolution decisions have also undermined basic tenets of part-
nership law, including a partner's right to dissolve the partnership rela-
tion at will,"4 the dissolution of the partnership upon the bankruptcy of
a general partner,' 4 ' and the partners' ability to reject substitute perform-
ance of the partnership agreement.142 In so doing, these decisions have
decreased the degree to which parties interested in forming partnerships
may rely upon the protections of the well-established body of partnership
law in formulating their agreements. Such decisions have also de-stabi-
lized the delicate balance between partnership and bankruptcy concerns
currently embodied in the Code. The drafters of the Code could not have
intended such a result. 14 3
Finally, the fiduciary nature of partnership relations requires that part-
ners be allowed to determine who will be members of their partnership
family and when that relationship will come to an end. By undermining
this basic provision of partnership law, and by protecting the interests of
the debtor over non-debtor partners, courts have unjustifiably increased
the risks and the uncertainties facing partners.'"
re Walsh), 14 Bankr 385, 386-87 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1981) (same); with In re Cardinal In-
dus., Inc., 116 Bankr. 964, 981-82 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990) (management interest may be
assumed by trustee and assigned formally or informally to debtor).
139. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 88.
143. The partnership is a highly desireable and prevalent form of business organiza-
tion, offering flexibility and unique benefits not found in other business forms. See Brom-
berg, supra note 2, at 668. See generally Volz, supra note 92, §§ 1.03-1.04 at 2-14
(comparing and discussing benefits of corporation and partnership business forms). In
enacting the Bankruptcy Code, therefore, it is unlikely that Congress intended to subvert
the underpinnings of partnership law or to undermine the partnership as a reliable and
attractive form of business organization. Nor is it likely that such a result would be
permissible. As one court has stated: "[b]ankruptcy legislation... cannot be applied so
as to render an equally well-intended body of state law to be nugatory." Williams v. Holt
(In re Holt), 40 Bankr. 1009, 1011 (S.D. Ga. 1984); see also City of New York v. Quanta
Resources Corp. (In re Quanta Resources Corp.), 739 F.2d 912, 919 (3d Cir. 1984)
("goals of the federal bankruptcy laws, including rehabilitation of the debtor, do not au-
thorize transgression of state laws setting requirements for the operation of the business
even if the continued operation of the business would be thwarted by applying state
laws") (emphasis added), aff'd sub nom., Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl.
Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986); Nimmer, supra note 11, at 552 ("federal Bankruptcy
Code cannot be examined solely on the basis of [its] internal effects within the bankruptcy
system and [its] impact on individual parties," but also must be examined on the basis of
its effect on "more general and economic and social processes").
144. Ironically, these risks and uncertainties may pose significant problems for future
debtor partners. For example, Professor Nimmer hypothesizes that the invalidation of
relatively inexpensive termination clauses will lead to more costly alternatives, see Nim-
mer, supra note 11, at 554, while Professor Fogel suggests that parties to personal service
contracts (i.e. partners) should abandon the contract when a party's bankruptcy seems
imminent. See Fogel, supra note 10, at 350-51.
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CONCLUSION
While many courts have upheld the dissolution provisions of state
partnership law and of the partnership agreements themselves, others
have relied upon section 365(e) of the Bankruptcy Code and public pol-
icy arguments to prohibit dissolution when a general partner files for
bankruptcy.
Section 365(e)(2), however, must be read to relieve partnership agree-
ments from the nullifying effect of section 365(e)(1). Partnership agree-
ments are personal service contracts and are non-delegable under both
general contract and partnership law. Furthermore, whether assumption
of the agreement is by the trustee, the debtor in possession or a third-
party assignee, each of these scenarios amounts to prohibited substitute
performance. This conflict, therefore, precludes the possibility that the
debtor partner can assume or continue to perform the partnership
agreement.
The bankruptcy courts should specifically enforce the dissolution pro-
visions of partnership agreements, including the relevant state law provi-
sions that are implicit in every partnership agreement. Such a standard
will recognize the fragile, fiduciary nature of the partnership relation,
while balancing the rehabilitative interests of the debtor partner with the
interests of the non-debtor partners in protecting the benefit of their bar-
gain. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, strict adherence to dissolu-
tion provisions will promote predictability for specific partnership
agreements, and will stabilize the interplay between partnership and
bankruptcy law.
Lawrence J. La Sala
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